It is something of a puzzle that politicians around the world have choosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their possibilities to …ne-tune the economy. In this paper the determinants of central bank independence (CBI) reforms are studied using a new data set on the possible event of such reforms in 119 countries. According to the data, as much as 81 countries had implemented CBI-reforms during the study period. Tne results indicate, moreover, that policymakers are more likely to delegate power to independent central banks when the foreign debt is relatively high. In non-OECD countries, the likelihood of a CBI-reform also seem to increase when policymakers face a high probability of getting replaced.
Introduction
Over the two last decades a number of countries, ranging from New Zealand to Lesotho, England, Kazakhstan, Sweden and Chile, have implemented institutional reforms which grant their central banks more independence from the political process. It is, however, something of a puzzle that political policymakers choose to give up control over monetary policy when they know that monetary policy (at least in the short run) in ‡uence employment and production levels.
There exist a number of theoretical explanations. It has been suggested, for example, that central bank independence (CBI) reforms should occur in countries with high and persistent in ‡ation (Rogo¤, 1985) , where price stability has already been achieved (Cukierman, 1994) , where the government debt is relatively high (Max…eld, 1997) , where the political system is characterized by a high degree of competition (Cukierman, 1994) , where the …nancial sector is relatively in ‡uential (Posen, 1993) , and so on. 1 However, the question why political policymakers choose to delegate authority to central banks has (as far as we know) never been tested empirically. Previous empirical studies (de Haan and Van't Hag, 1995; Cukierman and Webb, 1995; de Haan and Siermann, 1996; Bagherei and Habib, 1998) have instead used various CBI-indices to investigate what determines a given level (i.e., not a change) of CBI. This means that these studies only can explain cross-country di¤erences in CBI, while the more interesting ques-1 A number of other explanations have also been suggested in the literature (for an overview, see e.g., chapter …ve in Eij¢ nger and de Haan, 1996) . The possible determinants of central bank independence reforms are thourougly discussed in the next section, while the empirical proxies that are used in this paper are presented in Section 3. tion concerning why policymakers choose to implement CBI-reforms remain unanswered.
The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of CBI-reforms using a new data set that contain the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 119 countries. According to the data, 81 of the 119 countries had implemented a CBI-reform during the period 1980-2005. Thus, the literature on the time-inconsistency of monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983) , together with Rogo¤'s (1985) suggestion that political policymakers should delegate power to a central bank with more in ‡ation averse preferences, seem to be one of the most in ‡uential macroeconomic …ndings in recent time.
The results presented in the paper indicate that countries with a high foreign debt ratio are more likely to implement CBI-reforms. In addition, in non-OECD countries, the likelihood of a CBI-reform seem to increase when policymakers face a high probability of getting replaced. Countries that are members of the European Union (EU) and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) also seem more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if other countries in these organizations recently have implemented such institutional reforms. On the other hand, CBIreforms seem unrelated to the level of in ‡ation.
In the next section, possible determinants of CBI-reforms are discussed.
The data used in this paper are described in Section 3. Section 4 then describes the econometric speci…cation, while the results are presented in Section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes and draws conclusions.
forms
It is commonly believed that CBI-reforms should reduce the in ‡ationary bias of policy and make a low in ‡ation rule credible. Kydland and Prescott's (1977) and Barro and Gordon's (1983) work on time inconsistency in monetary policy, together with Rogo¤'s (1985) suggestion that a central bank with more in ‡ation averse preferences can make a low in ‡ation policy credible, constitute the theoretical rationale for this belief.
Various empirical studies (e.g., Alesina, 1988; Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman et al., 1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Jonsson, 1995; and Eij¢ nger et al., 1998) have also found a negative correlation between an index re‡ecting the degree of CBI and average in ‡ation. Alesina and Summers (1993) could not …nd any correlation between CBI and unemployment, real economic growth, and real interest rates. As a result, there is a broad consensus that CBI improves the likelihood of achieving a low in ‡ation goal at no real economic costs.
Note that achievement of price stability, according to the time inconsistency theory, cannot be explained by a pre-commitment to central bank autonomy. If announcement of a CBI-reform is su¢ cient for achieving a low-in ‡ation goal, then it is optimal for the political policymakers to violate this promise when price stability is achieved (McCallum, 1997) . Thus, the time-inconsistency theory and empirical work on the correlation between average in ‡ation and CBI suggest that CBI-reforms are implemented because policymakers want to achieve low and stable in ‡ation.
On the other hand, Cukierman (1994) have suggested that CBI-reforms may be implemented to maintain low in ‡ation, i.e., as a committing device against future uncarefull policymakers. This implies that political policymakers implement CBI-reforms when they already have achieved a low and stable in ‡ation. Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008) found, by comparing the implementation dates of central bank independence reform with the long term in ‡ation trends for 29 OECD-countries, that price stability had been achieved in most countries before their central banks did become more independent. This constitute support for Cukierman's (1994) argument that CBI-reforms can be used as an instrument against future uncarefull policymakers.
According to the time-inconsistency model of monetary policy, the bene…ts of surprise in ‡ation is directly related to the gap between the policymakers unemployment target and the natural rate of unemployment. This implies that an institutional reform that delegates autorithy to an independent central bank is more valuable for the policymakers when the natural rate of unemployment is relatively high (Cukeriman, 1994; Eij¢ nger and Schaling, 1995) .
It has, moreover, been suggested that CBI-reforms are implemented, especially in developing countries, to signal creditworthiness to foreign investors (Max…eld, 1997) Political factors may also in ‡uence the decision to delegate power to independent central banks. According to Cukierman (1994) , countries that are characterized by a high degree of regime political instability are less likely to delegate authority to independent central banks. Irregular changes of government due to revolutions, coup d´etat etc often occur in these countries, implying that policymakers mainly are concerned with its own survival. On the other hand, when the politicians in o¢ ce fear that they might lose power in the next election, central bank independence reforms may be implemented to reduce the decision-power of the incoming government. Moser (1994) has presented some evidence indicating that countries characterized by extensive check and balances (i.e., multiple veto players) have more independent central banks. Posen (1993) argued that the observed negative correlation between the degree of CBI and in ‡ation is illusionary. The reason is that in ‡ation and degree of CBI primarily is determined by …nancial opposition to in ‡ation, suggesting that CBI-reforms are implemented in countries where the …nan-cial sector is relatively in ‡uential. Analogously, CBI-reforms are also more likely to be implemented in countries where public opposition to in ‡ation is relatively strong. Posen (1993 ), Forder (1996 and Hayo (1998) have all argued that CBI and the commitment to a low in ‡ation rule is jointly determined by social attitudes, i.e., CBI is an endogenously determined variable.
This suggests that independent central banks are successful in implementing low and stable in ‡ation merely because their independence re ‡ects a social attitude that supports low in ‡ation.
Data
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is a qualitative variable indicating whether a CBI-reform has been implemented in a particular year. show that the probability of response is increasing in GDP and decreasing for countries belonging to the Asian, South-American and the African continent compared to those belonging to the Australian, European and the North-American continent (statistically signi…cant results at conventional levels). The analysis further indicate that a country's in ‡ation rate does not seem to a¤ect the probability of response. 2 Other means of information (e.g., central bank publications, central bank acts, and scienti…c articles) were used to validate the e-mail answers and to obtain the relevant dates of CBI-reforms for the countries that did not respond to the e-mail questionnaire. The …nal sample used in this paper consist of 119 central banks. This means that we have information about the occurrence of CBI-reforms in 73 percent of the countries that initially were contacted by e-mail. 3 A list of all countries included in the …nal sample can be found in Table   A1 In the empirical study the reform year is indicated by one and all previous years with zeros. This is done in order to avoid explaining the period after the CBI reforms. Hence, the individual series ends the same year as the CBI reform. The dependent variable contains a large amount of zeros. The frequency for the full, OECD and non-OECD samples are displayed in Table   1 . The amount of zeros are 96.7, 95.5 and 97.2 percent for the full, OECD and non-OECD samples, respectively.
- Table 1 About Here -In order to study why countries choose to implement CBI-reforms, we control for both economic characteristics, political factors, and spatial de- The use of implementation dates in the empirical analysis does not take into account that the degree of CBI di¤er from one country to another. It is, for example, possible that the CBI-reforms in some countries predate the study period. Therefore, the value of the CBI-index developed by Cukier- A problem when working with macro-data for the large amount of countries considered in this paper concerns missing data. In Table 2 the number of missing observations in the full, OECD and non-OECD samples are displayed. As can be seen the problem is largest for the non-OECD sample. This in particular concerning the variables corresponding to unemployment, foreign debt, federation and political fragmentation. For the OECD (full) sample the problem is largest concerning the variables liquid assets and foreign debt (foreign debt and unemployment).
- Table 2 About HereSince missing data (if not missing at random) can obscure the results mean imputation with an EM-algorithm is used (see e.g. Little and Rubin, 1987) . Means and standard deviations for the imputed samples are displayed in Table 3 . The variables included are further discussed in Section 4.
- Table 3 About Here -To investigate why policymakers choose to implement central bank independence reforms we de…ne the unobserved latent reform pressure in country i = 1; 2; :::; n in year t = 1; 2; :::; T as
Here X it and Z it are vectors of economic respectively political variables that are assumed to a¤ect the CBI-reform pressure, while where i denotes country speci…c unobservable e¤ects and it is a random error. In the speci…cation of a probit random e¤ects model it is assumed that it IN (0; 2 ). 7 The CBI-reform pressure can only be observed in dichotomous form, i.e.
is the observed reform decision. The parameters of the model are estimated (Heckman, 1981) by noting that the distribution of y it conditional on i are independent normal. Thus
7 Estimation results for random e¤ects Logit as well as linear probability models with random e¤ects gave similar results.
where
and is the distribution funtion for a standard normal variate.
The vector of economic explanatory variables, X it , consist of proxies for economic factors that are assumed to in ‡uence the decision to delegate authority to an independent central bank. In ‡ation in country i is included to study whether CBI-reforms are more likely to be implemented in countries with high in ‡ation or in countries that already have achieved a low and stable in ‡ation. In the latter case we expect in ‡ation to be negatively related with the event of a CBI-reform, while in ‡ation should be positively associated with independence reforms if CBI mainly is implemented to make a low in ‡ation policy rule credible and thereby reduce in ‡ation.
The bene…ts of surprise in ‡ation and the credibility of a low policy in ‡a-tion rule is in the time-inconsistency model assumed to be determined by the gap between the policymakers unemployment target and the natural rate of unemployment. Therefore, unemployment is included to control whether a relatively high natural rate of unemployment makes surprise in ‡ation more bene…cial and thereby reduces the likelihood of a CBI-reform or whether it strenghteen the need for an institutional reform that makes the central bank more independence from the political policymakers. 8 The foreign debt as a percentage of GDP is also included as an explanatory variable. As discussed in Section 2, countries may voluntary or more or less involuntary be forced to implement CBI-reforms in order to signal creditworthiness to foreign investors. Hence, the likelihood of a CBI-reform should be higher in countries with relatively high debt ratios.
Z it include political factors that are assumed to in ‡uence the decision to make the central bank more independent. For example, regime political instability is assumed to reduce the probability that a CBI-reform is implemented. Regime political instability is approximated with the degree and variation of political freedom in country i based on the annual ratings of political rights and civil liberties reported by Freedom House. As discussed in the previous section, we use the data compiled by Lundell and Karvonen (2003) where the number 1 represent the highest degree of freedom and 3 the lowest. The level of political freedom is in the empirical analysis measured by two dummy variables. The …rst dummy variable takes the value one if country i is characterized by a high degree of political freedom (i.e., freedom index=1), and zero otherwise; while the second dummy is equal to one if the level of political freedom is low in country i (i.e., freedom index=3). A moving variance series for a window length of three years is used to capture movements in political freedom within the country. As political policymakers in countries with a low level and high variation of political freedom might be concerned with their own survival, it is expected that central bank independence reforms are less likely to be implemented in such countries.
On the other hand, countries with high party political instability are expected to be more eager to implement central bank independence reforms.
When the government fear that they soon might be replaced, they have the opportunity to tie the hands of the next government by delegating power to an independent central bank. Party political instability is measured by the degree of political fragmentation in the parliament using Rae's index of party system fractionalization. A value of zero indicate that one party has all the seats in the parlament, whereas a value of 10,000 indicate that each party only has one seat in the parlament. In the latter case, the country is characterized by a very high level of party political instability.
The degree of …scal federalism is included as a dummy variable taking the value one if country i is a federation. Moser (1994) argues that countries with a high degree of federalism are more likely to have an independent central bank, suggesting that the likelihood of a CBI-reform should be positively related to the degree of …scal federalism. As noted by Posen (1993) and Hayo (1998) , CBI may also be determined by the degree of …nancial -and public opposition to in ‡ation. Financial opposition to in ‡ation is approximated with the liquid liabilities in country i 9 as percentage of GDP using the database on …nancial development and structure compiled by Beck et al. (1999) . We expect that the …nancial sector is relatively in ‡uential in countries that have a large …nancial sector, creating a positive correlation between the likelihood of a CBI-refom and liquid liabilities in country i.
The decision to implement a CBI-reform may also be in ‡uenced by the initial level of CBI. It is, for example, possible that countries that already have established independent central banks (e.g., Germany) are less likely to implement CBI-reforms. The CBI-index developed by Cukierman et al. (1992) is, therefore, included as an explanatory variable in the estimated model.
Finally, in order to control for spatial e¤ects, we also include an interaction term measuring whether countries that are members of the European Union (EU), the African Economic Community (AEC), the Asian-Paci…c Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) are more likely to launch CBI-reforms if many other member countries implemented such reforms in the previous period.
Results
The results from the estimation of the probit random e¤ect model are presented in Table 4 below. As discussed previously, di¤erent factors may in ‡u-ence the decision to implement CBI-reforms in industrialized and developing countries. Results are, therefore, also presented separately for OECD and non-OECD countries.
An analysis of the generalized residuals (based on Gourieroux et. al., 1987) for the random e¤ects probit models show no residual autocorrelation.
Further, a likelihood ratio test for the models estimated on each of the samples where used to assess the overall performace (against a constant only speci…cation). The LR-statistic (with 15 d.f.) where 55.73, 31.95 and 38.55 for the full, OECD, and non-OECD sample, respectively. Thus, the LR-tests indicate that the estimated models are signi…cant at conventional levels.
Table 4 About Here
As can be seen from Table 4 , countries that are characterized by high foreign debt ratios seem more likely to implement CBI-reforms than countries with lower foreign debt ratios. This support the descriptive results previously presented by Max…eld (1997) , indicating that political policymakers choose to give up power to independent central banks in order to signal creditworthiness to foreign investors. Note that this e¤ect is statistically signi…cant at the 5% level for both OECD and non-OECD countries.
The time-inconsistency theory (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983; Rogo¤, 1985) implies that a CBI-reform must be implemented in order to improve the credibility of a low in ‡ation goal, suggesting that CBI-reforms are implement to reduce in ‡ation. On the other hand, Cukierman (1994) and Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008) have argued that central bank autonomy may have been institutionalized at a time when the policymakers have a commitment to low in ‡ation and used as a committing device against subsequent governments. In this case, we expect that CBI-reforms are implement when in ‡ation is low. The results presented in Table 4 does not support any of these hypotheses as the estimated in ‡ation parameter is negative, but not statistically signi…cantly determined. This suggests that the level of in ‡ation has no in ‡uence on the decision whether to grant the central bank with more independence from the political policymakers.
In fact, no other economic determinant of CBI-reforms is statistically signi…cantly determined at any conventional signi…cance level for the full sample. The gross domestic product is negative and statistically signi…-cant at the 10%-level when estimations are performed for the sub-sample of OECD-countries, suggesting that OECD-countries with relatively low GDP per capita are more likely to implement CBI-reforms. A possibly explanation is that countries such as Hungary, Polen and Turkey, in recent years have implemented CBI-reforms to harmonize their legislation with the more industrialized OECD-countries. Thus, creating a negative relationship between GDP per capita and the likelihood of a CBI-reform. This explanation is supported by Cukierman et al. (2002) , who noted that policymakers in formal socialistic countries choosed to create central banks with a very high level of CBI when they transformed their legislation.
Turning to the political determinants of CBI-reforms, the results indicate that non-OECD countries characterized by a high degree of political fragmentation are more likely to implement CBI-reforms. This suggests that CBI-reforms are more common when policymakers fear that they soon will be replaced. Hence, CBI-reforms seem to be implemented in order to tie the hands of incoming governments.
Note, however, that this e¤ect is not present among the more industrialized countries. In addition, in the non-OECD sample, the results indicate that CBI-reforms are more likely in countries that often change their political regime.
The number of CBI-reforms in period t 1 in the European Union (EU) and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) also seem to in‡uence the likelihood that policymakers in member countries delegate power to independent central banks. It thus seem to exist geographical clustering in time, i.e., countries in the same economic cooperation seem more likely to give up power to independent central banks if many other countries in the same cooperation recently have implemented CBI-reforms.
It is something of a puzzle that politicians in a large number of countries recently have chosen to delegate power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to …ne-tune the economy. This paper should be seen as a …rst attempt to empirically investigate why political policymakers choose to give up power to independent central banks.
The lack of compiled data on the occurrence of CBI-reforms can probably explain why no previous study has investigated why politicians choose to delegate power to independent central banks. Therefore, we have collected 
